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What Are International Institutions?1
JOHN S. DUFFIELD

Department of Political Science, Georgia State University
International Studies Review 9, no. 1 (forthcoming Spring 2007)
International institutions are a central focus of international relations scholarship as well
as of policymaking efforts around the world. Despite their importance, our scholarly
literature lacks a widely accepted definition of just what they are. Instead, scholars have
employed a range of largely nonoverlapping conceptions, contributing to a fragmentation
of the literature and hindering theoretical cumulation. This essay seeks to remedy this
unsatisfactory state of affairs. It first reviews the principal ways in which international
institutions have been conceptualized and identifies their shortcomings. It then develops
a definition that promises to be inclusive of what are commonly regarded as the most
important institutional forms without losing analytical coherence. A final section
discusses some of the concrete benefits that may result from employing the new
definition, both in improving existing scholarship and by suggesting valuable new
avenues of research.
_______________________________________________________________________
There are at least as many definitions of (international) institutions as there are theoretical
perspectives.
Thomas Risse (2002: 605)
Over the years, international institutions of various types--treaties, organizations, regimes,
conventions, etc.--have grown greatly in numbers and importance. Paralleling this growth, the
scholarly literature on international relations has seen successive waves of efforts to describe and
explain institutional phenomena. Indeed, international institutions have frequently been at the
center of leading theoretical debates in the field.
Nevertheless, this scholarly literature lacks a widely accepted definition of international
institutions, an absence that has had several unfortunate consequences. First, the term is
frequently used to refer to distinctly different empirical phenomena, such as intergovernmental
organizations, international regimes, and sets of norms. Not only does this practice result in
much potential for confusion, but it means that the findings of most studies of “international
institutions” apply to only limited sets of institutional forms. For example, John Richard’s
(1999) “positive theory of international institutions,” in fact, concerns only interstate regulatory
agreements.
Second, a number of scholarly works may have been unnecessarily flawed because of
their failure to recognize the various distinct forms that international institutions can take. As a
1
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result, some studies have defined institutions in one way, only to use the term later to refer to
other forms. For example, Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal (2001: 762)
define international institutions as “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors,
that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior,” yet they proceed to include in their analysis
the very different form of international organization that performs various functions as actor or
agent. More seriously, it may be unacknowledged variation in the nature of the institutions
themselves rather than other factors that account for the patterns of outcomes that such studies
seek to explain.
Third, the international relations literature remains unnecessarily balkanized as adherents
of different conceptions talk past one another, when they attempt to communicate at all. In
particular, the field is characterized by still largely isolated rationalist and constructivist camps,
which emphasize more or less formal rules and intersubjective norms, respectively. Although
significant progress is being made within specific research programs, the result has been a
patchwork understanding of international institutions rather than the development of
comprehensive theory. As Martha Finnemore (1996b: 326) has noted, “incommensurable
definitions mean that despite similarities in labeling, [rationalist and sociological] approaches-all called institutionalist--have little in common.” Not only do general claims about the causes or
consequences of “international institutions” possess only limited validity, but potentially
important phenomena and interesting questions that transcend the conceptions employed by
individual research programs may be overlooked.
In order to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs, a broad definition of international
institutions that incorporates the most important institutional forms is required. Certainly, such a
definition is a prerequisite for the development of any equally comprehensive theories on the
subject. As Elinor Ostrom (1986: 4) has argued, “no scientific field can advance far if the
participants do not share a common understanding of key terms.” Likewise, a comprehensive
definition would provide a common framework within which one could locate more specific
types of international institutions and relate them to one another, facilitating a fuller appreciation
of their similarities and differences as well as the links between them.
This essay seeks to address this need. It first reviews the principal ways in which
international institutions have been conceptualized and identifies their shortcomings. It then
develops a definition of international institutions that promises to be inclusive of what are
commonly regarded as the most important institutional forms without losing analytical
coherence. To this end, international institutions are defined as relatively stable sets of related
constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system,
the actors in the system (including states as well as non-state entities), and their activities. This
definition integrates existing conceptions while expressing two important distinctions, one
ontological and one functional, that are not simultaneously present in any existing definition. A
final section discusses some of the concrete benefits that may result from employing this new
definition. It is proposed that this new definition, both in improving existing scholarship and by
suggesting new avenues of research.
Existing Definitions of International Institutions
Robert Keohane’s (1988: 382) critical observation that “institutions are often discussed without
being defined at all, or after having been defined only casually” is hardly less true today than
when it was made nearly two decades ago. Indeed, even works that purport to provide general
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surveys of institutional phenomena often offer only the most cursory discussions of the meaning
of the term “institution,” if they provide any at all. In his landmark study The Anarchical
Society, for example, Hedley Bull (1977) explores the contributions of the “institutions of
international society” to international order without anywhere defining explicitly the former.2
Likewise, two otherwise valuable recent overviews of the institutional literature fail to grapple
with the fundamental question of just what international institutions are. At least Steven Weber
(1997: 233) frankly acknowledges that he “will sneak by the challenge of defining an institution”
with the justification that the approaches he discusses “are sufficiently different that to develop
one definition that will travel across them would be difficult.” In contrast, the contribution by
Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons (1998) on theoretical and empirical studies of international
institutions to the special fiftieth anniversary issue of International Organization does not even
raise the question of definitions, and the preface in Martin and Simmons’ (2001: 1) subsequent
edited volume on international institutions offers only a one-paragraph “definitional comment.”
Where scholars have paid careful attention to definitional issues, they have sometimes
offered conceptions that are excessively broad, including elements that are best viewed as
distinct from institutions. For example, K.J. Holsti (2004: 20-23) describes institutions in terms
of patterned practices and actions, sets of ideas and/or beliefs, and norms and rules. Although he
is attentive to the causal links between these components, many scholars would regard one or
more of them as unnecessary or superfluous to a definition of institutions per se.
No less frustrating for students of international institutions has been the existence of
several generally nonoverlapping conceptions that are less than comprehensive. As a result,
well-intentioned efforts to bring clarity to the subject have in some ways only added to the
confusion. These conceptions can be grouped roughly into four categories: institutions as formal
organizations, practices, rules, and norms.
Traditional Conceptions: Institutions as Formal Organizations
Traditionally, scholars and others have frequently used the term “international institution” to
refer to formal international organizations, for example, the international financial institutions of
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The equation of organizations with
institutions may have made a certain amount of sense in the 1950s and 1960s when international
organizations were the principal subject of institutional inquiry by scholars. As studies of other
international institutional forms, such as regimes, have proliferated in the past three decades,
however, such a restricted construction of the concept has become misleading and, as a result,
inappropriate.
Nevertheless, the practice has remained common even in highly theoretical works. For
example, Arthur Stein (1990: 27, fn.3) implicitly equates international institutions with
international organizations. In “Institutions and Collective Action,” Wayne Sandholtz (1993)
explicitly identifies the Commission of the European Community as an institution. In
“Institutions for the Earth,” Peter Haas, Robert Keohane, and Marc Levy (1993: 397) focus
almost exclusively on the activities of international organizations. And in “Credibility, Costs,
and Institutions,” Lisa Martin (1993: 423) operationalizes international institutions in terms of
international organizations.
See also Barry Buzan (2004: 169). More generally, Buzan (2004: 167) acknowledges that “[m]ost English School
writers spend little if any time defining what they mean by ‘the institutions of international society.’”
2
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Early Sociological Conceptions: Institutions as Practices
The emergence of the literature on international regimes in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to
the first conscious efforts by international relations scholars to view international institutions in
broader terms and to define them systematically. Leading regime theorists such as Oran Young
(1980:332; 1986:107) and Robert Keohane (1984: 57) argued that regimes should be
conceptualized as social institutions, which, in turn, required that institutions be defined.
Young (1983:93) himself made the first careful attempt to provide a definition of
international institutions. Borrowing from sociology, he developed an initial definition of social
institutions as “recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which expectations converge.”
In the late 1980s, Young (1989:506) presented a more refined version: “identifiable practices
consisting of recognized roles linked together by clusters of rules or conventions governing
relations among the occupants of these roles.” Thus, for Young, “International institutions are
social institutions governing the activities of the members of international society.” Although
path-breaking, Young’s initial attempt to define international institutions never developed a
strong following within the community of international relations scholars. The precise reasons
for this lack of popularity are difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, one can identify at least three
aspects of Young’s definition that limited its usefulness and attractiveness.
In one sense, this earlier sociological conception was too narrow. Young (1989:32; also
1986:108) drew a sharp distinction between social institutions and organizations, which he
defined as “material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel,
equipment, and budgets.” According to Young (1989: 12-13, 25), social institutions, in general,
and international institutions, in particular, “may or may not be accompanied by explicit
organizations.” In fact, this distinction was probably exaggerated. In focusing on the material
aspects of organizations, Young overlooked the fact that many, notably intergovernmental,
organizations are primarily sets of roles and rules.
In another sense, this sociological conception was too broad, at least in the view of many
political scientists, as revealed by Young’s (1989: 33) statement that “even war is a social
institution” (see also Young 1986: 107; Bull 1977). Certainly, the ways in which wars have been
practiced at different times and places may have been shaped by social institutions, but many
would disagree with the assertion that war-- “a state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict
carried on between nations, states, or parties,” by one authoritative definition (Morris 1975)--is a
social institution, since it is not necessarily rule governed (for example, Holsti 2004: Chap. 9).
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the sociological conceptions from which Young
drew inspiration, however, is the close degree to which they associate institutions with behavior.
Whether the precise term used is “behavior” or “practice,” the primary emphasis is on the actions
and activities of the actors concerned rather than other institutional features. Consistent with this
interpretation, Young (1989:13, fn. 5) explicitly notes “the importance of a behavioral approach
to the empirical identification of regimes.” Although this behavioral conception of institutions
may have some uses, it nevertheless requires limiting one’s explanatory ambitions accordingly or
risking committing the logical fallacy of first identifying institutions on the basis of observed
behavior and then using them to “explain” that same behavior (Keohane 1993: 27).
Rationalist Conceptions: Institutions as Rules
Much more common in the literature is the rationalist (or rationalistic) conception of institutions
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as sets of more or less formal rules. In rationalist analysis, agents are assumed to act rationally to
maximize their utilities, subject to external constraints. Figuring importantly among these
constraints are institutions, which, in the rationalist conception, are consciously constructed
frameworks established by agents seeking to promote or protect their interests (see Scott 1995:
27; Krasner 1999: 60).
According to Simmons and Martin (2002: 194), “most scholars have come to regard
international institutions as sets of rules meant to govern international behavior,” where rules
“are often conceived of as statements that forbid, require, or permit particular kinds of actions.”
Somewhat more broadly, Keohane (1988: 343; 1989: 3) has defined institutions as “persistent
and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain
activity, and shape expectations.”3 This definition and variations of it have been widely,
although not universally, cited in theoretical studies of international institutions (for example,
Martin 1992: 39; Weber 1997: 233 ). Moreover, a leading critic of institutional theories has
advanced a very similar definition (Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 8), thereby facilitating a
constructive debate between those who find international institutions to be highly consequential
and those who do not.
What have been the attractions of the rationalist conception of international institutions as
rules, especially in comparison with the sociological conception as expressed by Young?
Perhaps most importantly, it distinguishes sharply between institutions and behavior, since the
purpose of much rationalist theorizing is precisely to explain actions and outcomes (for example,
Simmons and Martin 2002: 194). Thus, this conception avoids the danger of tautological
reasoning that has so concerned the critics of behavioral conceptions. Indeed, Young (1996: x)
himself has offered a revised definition of institutions that, like Keohane’s, places primary
emphasis on rules and clearly differentiates between them and behavior.
As a result, and in conjunction with rational actor assumptions more generally, this
conception has proven to be very productive in terms of generating powerful yet parsimonious
explanatory theories. Rationalist theories view international institutions as affecting behavior
and outcomes by structuring the incentives and constraints that characterize the strategic
environment within which instrumentally motivated, utility-maximizing actors operate. More
specifically, institutional rules can reduce transaction costs, establish benchmarks for evaluating
the behavior of others, provide information, promote issue linkage, and facilitate enforcement
(for example, Keohane 1988: 386; Krasner 1988: 69; Martin 1992: 7, 39).
Despite its popularity and demonstrated usefulness, the rationalist conception of
international institutions as sets of more or less formal rules also contains features that have
limited its acceptance--and will in all probability continue to do so. As a practical matter, this
conception, too, seems to omit important classes of international institutions. It leaves unclear
the status of international organizations--some definitions include them (for example, Keohane
1989: 3-4) while others do not (for example, Simmons and Martin 2002: 194)--and international
law. And it would appear to have no place for the most fundamental institutions of the
international system, such as state sovereignty.4 These omissions may follow from two more
3

Keohane did not himself describe this definition as rationalist. Indeed, he viewed it as being potentially useful for
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fundamental limitations.
First, the emphasis on rules that are consciously devised by those who would be subject
to them necessarily obscures the intersubjective and deontic characteristics that are often
associated with institutions. As an analyst of the kindred new institutionalism in economics has
observed, “actors merely [acknowledge] the existence of the rule systems--recognizing the
validity of the rules--without necessarily believing that the rules are fair or justified” (Scott 1995:
36). Yet, as Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie (1986:364-368) argue in a seminal article on
international regimes that could apply just as well to the broader concept of international
institutions, “we know regimes by their principled and shared understandings of desirable and
acceptable forms of social behavior. Hence, the ontology of regimes rests upon a strong element
of intersubjectivity.” In addition, they note, “what distinguishes international regimes from other
international phenomena--from strategic interaction, let us say--is a specifically normative
element.”
Second, the rationalist conception’s emphasis on the behavioral consequences of rules
diverts attention from the ways in which institutions may endow actors with certain powers and
capacities and, in some cases, even create them. As Ruggie (1998: 871) has argued, rationalist
approaches lack “any concept of constitutive rules.” Instead, actors and their interests are
typically treated as given and exogenous to the institutions in question (see also Krasner
1988:69; Scott 1995: 29). In contrast, Young (1989: 15-16), to his credit, places equal weight on
the roles inherent in international institutions and the rights associated with them.
Constructivist Sociological Conceptions: Institutions as Norms
At least partly in response to the limitations of the dominant rationalist conception just discussed,
yet another sociological conception of international institutions, which is commonly called
“constructivist,” has emerged in more recent years. In the words of Finnemore and Sikkink
(2001: 392), “constructivists focus on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument
in politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or ‘intersubjective’ ideas and
understandings on social life.” Accordingly, the constructivist conception places primary, and
often explicit emphasis, on the intersubjective aspect of international institutions. As such,
constructivists regard institutions as fundamentally ideational phenomena involving ideas that
are shared by members of a collectivity (Wendt 1999: 94, 96). In contrast to the rationalist
conception, advocates of this perspective “emphasize that institutions are often not created
consciously by human beings but emerge slowly through a less deliberative process, and that
they are frequently taken for granted by the people who are affected by them” (Keohane 1988:
389; see also Barnett 1996: 159).
The term that is most often employed to represent these qualities is “norm.” Within this
literature, social institutions are generally viewed as consisting of norms or sets of norms (for
example, Klotz 1995: 19; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891; Wendt 1999: 96). Norms, in turn,
are usually defined by constructivists as socially shared expectations, understandings, or
standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (for example, Klotz 1995: 14;
Finnemore 1996a: 22; Katzenstein 1996: 5; Legro 1997: 33; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891;
Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner: 2001, 106).
however, as a “practice” (rather than as a set of rules per se) in the context of those institutions that consist of
general patterns of activity, thereby verging on Young’s behavioral conception.
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Constructivists typically go on to distinguish between two main types of norms (for
example, Klotz 1995: 14-15; Katzenstein 1996: 5; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891; Ruggie
1998: 871). First, there are regulative (regulatory or prescriptive) norms. These are similar to
the rules stressed in rationalist conceptions insofar as they order and constrain behavior. Unlike
more or less formal rules, however, they have an essentially evaluative or deontic quality. As
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) have written, “it is precisely the prescriptive (or evaluative)
quality of ‘oughtness’ that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules.”
Second, and representing a more fundamental departure from rationalist conceptions,
there are constitutive norms (for example, Keohane 1988: 382; Krasner 1988: 67; Wendt and
Duvall 1989: 60-63; Klotz 1995: 19; Barnett 1996: 159; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891;
Ruggie 1998). These components of institutions generate agents, endow them with certain
capabilities and powers, and determine their underlying identities, interests, and preferences.
They also define social activities and categories of action. Indeed, in the words of John Searle
(1995: 27), “they create the very possibility of certain activities.”
Not only does the constructivist conception, in contrast to the rationalist approach,
highlight the intersubjective and constitutive aspects of international institutions, it also
distinguishes, if not always explicitly, between institutions and practices, unlike the earlier
sociological approach (see, for example, Wendt and Duvall 1989: 62; Finnemore and Sikkink
1998: 892). Nevertheless, the constructivist conception has not yet had an impact on the
international relations literature comparable to that of the rationalist viewpoint. In contrast to the
sociological and rationalist conceptions considered above, it continues to lack a prominent
definitional expression comparable to those provided by Young and Keohane. More generally, it
is the least well developed of the various conceptions, in no small part because many of its
adherents have not been primarily concerned with exploring the nature, determinants, or
consequences of international institutions per se (an important exception is Risse 2002).
A more fundamental problem is that in its attempt to correct for the “thinness” of its
rationalist counterpart, the constructivist conception may go too far in the other direction. In
particular, it seems to neglect the formal features that are often characteristic of specific
international institutions, at least as they are popularly conceived. Presumably, many scholars
would disagree with the contention that one must necessarily probe beneath the surface for
intersubjective norms before one can regard a particular treaty or organization as an international
institution.
A New Definition of International Institutions
Even though several useful conceptions of international institutions can be found in the
international relations literature, each has limitations that prevent it from serving as an adequate
foundation for the development of comprehensive theories of international institutions. Still
needed is an analytically coherent, yet sufficiently encompassing definition that can facilitate
theoretical progress on a broad front. The following section aspires to provide such a definition
This effort is based on several principles. First, an adequate definition should be
comprehensive enough to accommodate all commonly regarded forms of international
institutions. At the same time, however, a definition should not be so expansive as to be
rendered analytically useless. One must guard against blurring the distinction between
international institutions and related, but arguably distinct, phenomena such as ideas in general
or international cooperation.
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Second, in view of the diversity of international institutions, a definition should facilitate
the differentiation and comparison among specific forms. But such a definition should not go as
far as Elinor Ostrom (1986: 4), who has argued that “the multiple referents for the term
‘institution’ indicates [sic] that multiple concepts need to be separately identified and treated as
separate terms.” Nevertheless, any definition that does not simultaneously lay the groundwork
for a taxonomy of international institutions would be inadequate.
Third, and finally, the definition should contain a logical basis for this differentiation. It
is not sufficient simply to provide a list and description of different types of international
institutions. Rather, it is important to place any taxonomy on a solid analytical footing if it is to
have a substantial empirical and theoretical payoff (see also Raymond 1997: 226).
In view of these considerations, it is proposed that international institutions be defined as
relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that
pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including states as well as non-state
entities), and their activities. Any particular international institution need not contain all of these
elements. Indeed, it might consist of only one, for instance, constitutive norms or procedural
rules, although most international institutions are unlikely to be so simple. It is also important to
acknowledge that the terms “relatively stable” and “related” are inherently subjective, so some
clarification may be helpful. By the former is meant that an institution will exhibit at least some
persistence, durability, and resilience in the face of changing circumstances. By the latter is
meant that institutional elements are associated or connected in some meaningful way, such as
by a functional or formal relationship. Nevertheless, where one locates the boundaries of any
particular institution may not be obvious and may be disputed by others.
This definition clearly represents an amalgamation and synthesis of existing conceptions
of international institutions and, thus, owes a substantial debt to the conceptual efforts of others,
especially Keohane and Young. As such, though, it also seeks to express two important
distinctions--one ontological and one functional--that are not simultaneously present in any other
definition and that serve as the analytical basis for a comprehensive taxonomy of international
institutions. These two distinctions are explored in some detail in the remainder of this section.5
Ontological Distinctions: Intersubjective vs Formal Elements
The first distinction is between the intersubjective and formal elements of institutions as
emphasized by the constructivist and rationalist conceptions, respectively. Although these
elements may often be tightly intertwined as a practical matter, they can and should be
distinguished conceptually. In order to express this distinction, let us employ the word “norms,”
as used by constructivists, to refer to the intersubjective elements and the word “rules,” as used
by rationalists, to refer to the formal elements. Admittedly, this linguistic choice is not
unproblematic, and some readers may object to it. The words “norms” and “rules” have been
assigned numerous meanings in the international relations literature. Typically, moreover, these
meanings are quite similar and the words are often used interchangeably (see, for example,
5

These are not the only potentially important distinctions one can make among international institutions. For
example, Young (1989: 13) distinguishes between international orders--broad framework arrangements governing
the activities of all or almost all members of international society--and international regimes that are more
specialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve
only some subset of the members of international society. Similarly, the English School literature differentiates
between primary institutions, which define the basic character and purpose of international society, and secondary
institutions, which are more akin to regimes (Buzan 2004: xviii, 167).
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Keohane 1988: 383; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989: 129-30; Cortell and Davis 1996; Finnemore
and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2002: 604; Holsti 2004). Nevertheless, such a distinction is not
inconsistent with their broader usage and, for lack of better terms, would seem to provide an
adequate way of expressing the ontological difference that is of concern here.
Although few institutions may be entirely ideational in nature, constructivists have made
a compelling case for viewing them as intersubjective, at least in part. Thus, to an important
extent, institutions may exist in the minds of people and need not be written down anywhere. As
such, they may be characterized as “shared mental models” (Denzau and North 1994; Wendt
1999: 96; see also Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 764-65). These features of institutions typically
arise spontaneously rather than through a process of negotiation, although they may subsequently
be codified in writing or formal statements. This has been the case for many human rights
norms, laws of war, and diplomatic conventions. Likewise, given their implicitly consensual
nature, norms cannot be imposed, although they can be inculcated via such processes as
persuasion and socialization (see, for example, the norm “life cycle” described in Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998: 895-905).
The other fundamental characteristic of the intersubjective elements of international
institutions that bears repeating is their deontic, evaluative, or “normative” quality. 6 They are
shared beliefs about the way things should be or how things should be done. Norms, as the term
is used here, carry “a sense of obligation, a sense that they ought to be followed” (Chayes and
Chayes 1995: 113, emphasis in the original; see also Goertz and Diehl 1992: 638-639; Raymond
1997:217-218). One consequence of this characteristic of norms is that they “are
counterfactually valid. No single counterfactual occurrence refutes a norm. Not even many such
occurrences necessarily do.” Rather, whether a violation weakens a norm depends not least on
“how the community assesses the violation and responds to it” (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986:
767; see also Raymond 1997: 218; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 892). For instance, the fact that
noncombatants are sometimes intentionally targeted in war does not necessarily mean there is no
norm of noncombatant immunity.
Nevertheless, norms do vary in strength (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 892) and, as a
result, are likely to exert differing degrees of influence. The strength of a norm is determined by
at least two factors. One is the fraction of the members of a social system that share the norm, or
what has been called “concordance” (Legro 1997: 35) or “commonality” (Boekle, Rittberger, and
Wagner 2001). For example, there is near universal agreement that chemical weapons should
never be used (Price 1995), while the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention remains highly
contested (for example, Roberts 2003). Another is the intensity with which the norm is typically
held by members of the social system. Some norms may involve little sense of obligation while
others may be so deeply internalized as to be taken for granted. Contrast the proscription of the
use of force with the anti-slavery norm.
How do we know whether such institutions actually exist? More specifically, how can
we assess how widely shared a particular norm is or how strongly it is held? No scholarly
consensus exists on the measurement of norms. Nevertheless, nonbehavioral evidence for the
existence of norms can be culled from a number of sources, including surveys, experiments,
interviews, and participant-observation (see, for example, Hechter and Opp 2001). And in the
study of international norms, where it is often difficult to interact directly with the actors
Likewise, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) maintain that “both the intersubjective and the evaluative
dimensions are inescapable when discussing norms” and Goertz and Diehl (1992: 635) write that the term “[n]orm
reflects the deontological component that is lacking in the term rule.”
6
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involved, one can and must examine what people say and write, using such methods as content,
discourse, and historical analysis (see, for example, Raymond 1997).
As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 892) note, because norms exist in the mind, “we can
have only indirect evidence of their existence just as we can only have indirect evidence of most
other motivations for political action.” Nevertheless, precisely because “norms by definition
embody a quality of ‘oughtness’ and shared moral assessment, norms prompt justifications for
action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study.” Indeed,
norms must be expressed, from time to time, verbally or on paper, consciously or unconsciously,
for otherwise they could not be shared by members of a social group. What people say and write
not only reveals but reaffirms or reinforces their beliefs and in some cases even helps to create
new norms.
Thus, a number of constructivist international relations scholars have pointed to the need
to examine communicative processes or discourse in order to identify norms (see, for example,
Klotz 1995: 29-33; Finnemore 1996a: 23-24; Finnemore 2003: 15). Indeed, Kratochwil and
Ruggie (1986: 774) argued for the need for an interpretive approach to the study of regimes in
view of their inherently dialogical nature as long as two decades ago. In this sense, identifying
norms is akin to the process of determining whether a customary international law exists. States
must perceive that a particular practice is obligatory or required by law. How then do we know
this is the case? According to international legal scholars, an important part of the process is an
examination of the statements of government leaders and spokespersons (Arend 1999: 48).
Nevertheless, reliance on evidence of this type sometimes poses novel challenges. For
instance, the more strongly held a norm is, the less evidence there may be of its existence.
Finnemore (1996a: 23) has pointed out that “many norms are so internalized and taken for
granted that violations do not occur and the norm is hard to recognize.” As an illustration, she
cites the norm of statehood as the only appropriate and legitimate political unit in international
politics. Indeed, so deeply rooted is this norm that “most scholarship has treated and continues
to treat states as naturally occurring and inevitable rather than as socially constructed and
historically contingent” (Finnemore 1996a:23).
Intersubjective norms do not exhaust the characteristics of institutions, however.
Institutions typically have formal elements as well, to which above we assigned the term “rules.”
Indeed, it is these elements of international institutions that are most familiar. Consider, as
illustrations, the United Nations (UN) Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, or
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As these examples suggest, moreover,
the formal elements of international institutions, in contrast to norms, can have an existence that
is entirely separate from the agents that devised them. Norms and other intersubjective
phenomena require human consciousness to be sustained.
A related feature of rules, as the term is used here, is that they need not correspond to
what any affected party actually prefers or thinks should be the case. In contrast to the
intersubjective elements of international institutions, they need not possess any evaluative or
deontic content; no moral opprobrium is necessarily attached to their violation. Rather, rules
simply concern what things are and how things are done, for instance, the membership of the UN
Security Council, the dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and the voting rules of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Indeed, as these examples
suggest, rules may clash with the normative beliefs of many of the actors to which they apply.
Thus, a rule may be imposed by one actor on others, whereas a norm may not, and those upon
whom the rule is imposed may feel no sense of obligation to adhere to it, although they may
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comply for other reasons.
Just as norms may vary in strength, rules may exhibit differing degrees of formality or
formalization. Charles Lipson (1991) has distinguished between more or less formal agreements
on the basis of the level at which the agreement is made within the government and the form that
it takes. Thus a rule may be stated verbally, such as through an oral agreement, or written down,
such as in an interstate treaty (Aust 2000). For their part, treaties may simply be signed, as in an
executive agreement, or be subject to formal ratification by a legislative body. Other
possibilities lying along this spectrum include memoranda of understanding, exchanges of notes,
and joint communiques. Similarly, some international legal scholars have sought to make a
distinction between hard legalization and various instruments of “soft law” (Chinkin 1989;
Abbott and Snidal 2000). Among the latter figure interstate agreements that are explicitly
nonlegally binding (such as the Helsinki Final Act), non-binding or voluntary resolutions
formulated and adopted by international and regional organizations (such as those issued by the
UN General Assembly), formal treaties that lack identifiable rights and obligations, and codes of
conduct or guidelines adopted by intergovernmental organizations. The degree of formalization
determines the strength of a rule, especially where it is made legally binding.
Intentionally omitted from this definition is any conception of institutions as practices or
patterns of behavior. As noted above, some scholars have defined institutions in terms of
practices, but this approach has found little favor within the field of international relations.
Indeed, the need to distinguish institutional norms and rules from behavior is a leading area of
agreement among rationalists and constructivists. One reason is that a pattern of behavior, such
as recurring attempts to maintain a balance of power, may not conform to, or be influenced by,
any particular norm or rule. More fundamentally, the equation of institutions with behavior or
practices precludes the use of the former to explain the latter.
In practice, specific institutional elements can assume a wide range of forms. Some will
be pure rules, others will be pure norms, and yet others--perhaps most--are best characterized by
some combination of rule-like (formal) and norm-like (intersubjective) characteristics. For
example, a formal rule may be accompanied by a strong intersubjective belief in its legitimacy.
Moreover, the nature of a particular institutional element can change over time. Thus, a norm
may become formalized--one can point to many illustrations from the laws of war, human rights,
and diplomatic relations--while a formal rule may gradually lose moral force over time.
Nevertheless, it should be possible to locate any particular institutional element at a given
moment within a two-dimensional ontological space. Figure 1 attempts to do so, using examples
from a variety of domains. One of the dimensions—in this case the vertical--is defined in terms
of the strength of the norm-like characteristics, if any. The other dimension—the horizontal
here--is determined by the degree of formalization of the rule-like characteristics, if any. It is
important to stress that in this ontology, the norm- and rule-like characteristics are orthogonal to
one another rather than lying along a single continuum, as is sometimes suggested (see, for
example, Steinmo 2001: 7554).
[Put Figure 1 about here]
Functional Distinctions
The second important distinction captured by the definition concerns the functions that different
institutional elements perform. These functions can be divided into three broad categories: the
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constitutive, the regulative, and the procedural. The distinction between the constitutive and
regulative functions is already quite commonly made. As explained below, it is also useful to
distinguish a third, the procedural function. Before proceeding, it should be noted that some
norms and rules may be both constitutive and regulative at the same time. For example, the rules
regarding the movement of a chess piece simultaneously define what that piece is (see also
Schauer 1991: 7). Likewise, the documents establishing many international bodies also stipulate
what those bodies can and cannot do. But many are not both constitutive and regulative. Thus,
it remains important to be able to distinguish analytically among these three functions.7
Constitutive Function. The constitutive function of international institutions is in a
sense the most fundamental, since constitutive rules and norms “create the very possibility of
engaging in conduct of a certain kind” (Schauer 1991: 6). Without the prior constitution of
actors, for instance, there can be no action to regulate. Although some rationalist writings on
institutions hint at their constitutive role (for example, North 1990), this aspect has been
developed primarily in the work of constructivists and the closely related English School theory
of international relations (see Buzan 2004).
It is useful to distinguish among several more specific constitutive functions. In the first
place, institutional rules and norms can create social entities (actors) and determine their very
capabilities and other endowments related to action, such as rights. Indeed, this phenomenon is
perhaps most obvious in the realm of international relations, where virtually all actors are
institutionally constituted to an important extent. The most familiar example of such entities is
the sovereign state. By now, it has been well established that the state is a social construct (see,
for example, Biersteker and Weber 1996; Hall 1999). As an actor in the international system, the
state is essentially a bundle of roles and related rights associated with a given geographical
territory that are determined by the “basic rules of authority that define international relations”
(Philpott 2001: 3). The institution of state sovereignty has become increasingly formalized over
the years, but it still rests on a strong intersubjective basis.
The state is not the only institutionally constituted actor of consequence in international
affairs, however. A number of others are associated with international organizations. Most
common among these are collective intergovernmental bodies, such as the Security Council and
General Assembly of the UN, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Council of Ministers of the
European Union (EU), and the Board of Governors of the IMF as well as supranational executive
bodies, such as the UN Secretariat, the European Commission, and the staff of the World Bank.
Also possible, but still quite rare, are supranational judicial and legislative bodies composed of
elected or appointed individuals, such as the International Court of Justice, the European Court
of Justice, and the European Parliament. Intergovernmental and supranational actors are
typically constituted by formal treaties, agreements, and conventions among states, such as the
UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, or the decisions of intergovernmental bodies, such as
the resolution establishing the UN Human Rights Council.
Yet other noteworthy institutionally constituted actors may involve individual persons.
7

Oran Young (1999) offers a typology of regime or institutional tasks that distinguishes between regulative,
procedural, programmatic, and generative regimes. Despite the seeming similarity, his typology differs from the one
offered here in an important respect. Young’s typology refers to the overall task or tasks performed by a regime or
institution, while the present essay is concerned with the basic range of functions performed by institutional
elements. Thus, any programmatic or generative regime, for example, can in principle be decomposed into some
combination of constitutive, regulative, and procedural elements.
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Consider, for example, the UN Secretary General, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, the
Director-General of the WTO, the President of the World Bank, and diplomatic envoys.
Although the individuals involved already possess a physical existence, rules and norms endow
them with significant roles and rights.
Before proceeding, it is important to recognize that international organizations are not
institutions per se. Rather, they typically possess the qualities of both institutions, as defined
here, and agents. The UN Security Council, for example, is simultaneously a collective actor
and an arena or forum in which member states interact. In contrast to truly unitary actors,
moreover, much of the activity of such collective bodies is aimed at setting regulative rules for
members and authorizing, legitimizing, or condemning actions taken by them (see Claude 1966).
Whether it is more fruitful to regard an international organization as an institution or as an actor
will depend upon the precise question that one seeks to answer. As a practical matter, however,
it may be difficult to distinguish between organizational actors, on the one hand, and the norms
and rules that constitute them, regulate their behavior toward other actors, and determine their
internal processes, on the other.
Analytically distinct from the creation of actors is the role that institutions can play in
determining their identities, interests, goals, and preferences, which is a prominent theme in the
constructivist literature on norms (see, for example, Klotz 1995; Jepperson, Wendt, and
Katzenstein 1996; Katzenstein 1996). In some cases, these characteristics may be conferred
simultaneously with the very creation of an actor. Thus, the secretary general of an international
organization will generally possess an identity that is distinct from that of any other entity and an
interest in promoting the well-being of the organization and its membership. In other cases,
however, pre-existing actors, notably states and their leaders, may acquire new identities and
preferences as a result of their presence, participation, or embeddedness in an international
institution through processes of persuasion and socialization (Johnston 2001). In this regard,
particular attention has been paid to socializing processes within European institutions such as
the EU and NATO (see, for example, Checkel 2005).
Moreover, institutions may constitute activities and categories of action (Dessler 1989:
455; Schauer 1991: 6; Searle 1995: 27). To be sure, many forms of behavior, especially those of
a physical nature, can and do take place without the mediation of institutions. But institutions
often play a role in determining their social meaning, such as whether a use of force is to be
viewed as an act of aggression or a justifiable intervention or whether a tariff is a violation of
international law or a legitimate retaliatory activity. They specify what counts as a particular
activity. And, in some cases, they may define activities that would not otherwise even exist,
such as the exercise of the veto in the UN Security Council. Like sovereignty, the actions in
which states may or must engage have become increasingly formalized over the years; consider
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Law of Consular and Diplomatic
Immunities. But formalization is not a prerequisite for their existence, although it may affect
their impact and influence.
Regulative Function. Perhaps most familiar is the regulative function of institutions.
Many rules and norms seek to regulate the everyday behavior of actors (see also Ostrom 1990:
52). In this sense, Young (1989: 16) has defined rules as “well-defined guides to action or
standards setting forth actions that members [of an institution] are expected to perform (or to
refrain from performing) under appropriate circumstances.” Similarly, constructivists typically
describe norms as shared expectations or standards of appropriate behavior.
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Regulative (or operational) norms and rules can assume three basic forms (Dessler 1989:
457; Schauer 1991: 7-8). They may be prescriptive, requiring or obligating actors to behave in
certain ways. Examples include the provision of military assistance to allies when attacked, the
payment of assessed dues to an international organization, and intervention to prevent or stop
genocide. They may be proscriptive, prohibiting or forbidding various actions. Here one might
cite the UN Charter’s broad injunction to refrain from the threat or use of force, the ban on
torture, and restrictions on the application of quotas to traded goods. Or regulative norms and
rules may be permissive, allowing actors to engage in actions that nevertheless remain optional,
such as self-defense, the imposition of tariffs up to agreed levels, and the exploitation of
resources on the continental shelf. When fully specified, such norms and rules indicate the type
of action, the relevant actors, and the circumstances under which they are operative.
Another useful distinction is between primary norms and rules of behavior and secondary
or auxiliary regulative elements intended to increase the likelihood of compliance with the
primary ones. The secondary category includes transparency norms and rules concerning the
provision, gathering, and sharing of information about actors’ policies and actions in order to
facilitate determinations of compliance and noncompliance (Mitchell 1998). Examples are IMF
reporting requirements, inspection provisions in arms control agreements, and surveillance rights
such as those contained in the Open Skies Treaty. This category also includes rules and norms
regarding how actors should respond to instances of noncompliance by others. Although such
enforcement measures are somewhat rarer, one can readily point to prominent examples such as
the Covenant of the League of Nations, which required members to sever all economic relations
with an aggressor, and the provisions in the WTO agreements that allow members to impose
trade sanctions in certain circumstances.
Procedural Function. The procedural function of international institutions bears a
strong resemblance to the regulative function and might well be thought of as a subset of the
latter. Nevertheless, institutional scholars have sometimes taken pains to differentiate between
the two (see, for example, Young 1989; Ostrom 1990), and some self-described “institutionalist”
studies have focused entirely on procedures (for example, Garrett and Tsebelis 1996). How do
they differ? Regulative rules and norms typically concern behavior that directly affects the
physical world (Ostrom 1990: 50), while procedures typically govern actions by actors with
respect to one another within the context of institutions or with respect to the institutions
themselves. In particular, procedural arrangements often provide mechanisms that allow
participating actors to arrive at collective choices regarding problems that arise in the issue areas
covered by an institution (Young 1999: 28).
Obviously, a clear line does not always exist between these two functions, in part because
they are often closely related. For example, the UN Charter contains both regulative elements,
such as the general prohibition on the threat and use of force, and procedural elements, notably
the voting rules of the General Assembly and Security Council (as well as important constitutive
elements). Likewise, the institutions concerning international imports both regulate the
restrictions that countries can place on trade and provide procedures for the negotiation of lower
trade barriers and the resolution of disputes.
Although the procedural function of institutions is often associated with formal rules,
especially in the context of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), in some contexts it is
performed primarily or exclusively by intersubjective norms. Moreover, even the decisionmaking procedures of IGOs are not always formalized. Those of the Security Council, European
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Union, and International Monetary Fund are spelled out in considerable detail in the agreements
on which those bodies are based. In contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty is silent on the
procedures to be followed by the North Atlantic Council, where decision making has
consequently been guided by the norms of sovereign equality and consensus.
Potential Contributions of the New Definition
It is one thing to argue in the abstract that a particular definition is superior to the alternatives but
yet another to demonstrate that its adoption will result in better theoretical and empirical
research. Accordingly, this final section discusses three potential contributions of the new
definition.
Clarifying the Nature of Particular International Institutions
In the first place, this definition can help scholars make clearer the nature of the particular
institutions that are the subject of inquiry and thus the range of phenomena to which their claims
and findings actually apply. The ontological and functional distinctions expressed in the
definition provide the analytical basis for a comprehensive taxonomy of international institutions
as delineated in Table 1. Here, the columns are defined in terms of the ontological nature of the
institution, ranging from the purely formal to the purely intersubjective or involving some
combination of formal and intersubjective elements. The rows captures the various functions
that institutions can perform.
[Put Table 1 about here]
Consistent with the objective of providing a comprehensive definition of international
institutions, it should be possible to situate each of the distinct forms of international institutions
within this taxonomy. To be sure, the task is complicated by the fact that many institutions have
multiple elements, making it often difficult to assign them to a single category. As a result, some
scholars may object to the specific characterizations suggested here. But such objections should
not negate the value of attempting to clarify the nature of particular institutional elements.
Improving Existing Institutional Scholarship
The failure to recognize important variations in institutional forms can result in flawed research
on the causes and consequences of international institutions. The definition proposed here can
help to illuminate such flaws and suggest how they might be remedied or avoided in the first
place. One potential problem that the definition may help to prevent is the failure to specify the
full range of possible outcomes when treating international institutions as dependent variables.
An example can be found in the Rational Design project as presented by Barbara Koremenos,
Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal in 2001, which seeks to explain differences in the forms that
international institutions take. An important recent contribution to the theoretical literature on
international institutions as dependent variables, the project defines them as “explicit
arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize
behavior” (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001: 762). By emphasizing the regulative function,
however, this definition neglects the important constitutive choices that are often involved in the
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creation of international institutions. Not only must actors decide whether or not to establish
formal organizations, but they must choose between different types of bodies
(intergovernmental, supranational, etc.) and determine what functions, authority, and capabilities
to grant to those bodies. As a result of its constricted focus, the Rational Design project may
overlook important trade-offs in the design of international institutions.
A second potential pitfall with which this definition may help is the failure to specify the
full range of relevant institutional causal variables when exploring the effects of international
institutions, thereby running the risk of omitted variable bias. For example, the explanatory
framework employed in the Rational Design project overlooks the possibility that norms may
also be an important determinant of institutional design. A design that seems optimal on
efficiency grounds may nevertheless be regarded as inappropriate or illegitimate and thus may
not be chosen on the basis of normative considerations. Indeed, one of the case studies executed
for the project, on prisoners of war treaties, concerns a pre-existing set of norms that were
formalized in treaty form (Morrow 2001).
A similar oversight mars Jeffrey Legro’s (1997) otherwise valuable effort to compare the
relative impact of international norms and organizational culture. Examining eight cases
involving the use of particular means of warfare--chemical weapons, strategic bombing, and
submarine warfare--during World War II, he finds that organizational culture provides a more
consistent explanation of state preferences than do international norms. Legro’s analysis does
not, however, distinguish explicitly between the formal and intersubjective aspects of
international institutions. In fact, some of the international “norms” that he considers, such as
the 1925 Geneva Protocol, had important formal components. Indeed, the limited data presented
by Legro suggest a stronger correlation between state preferences and international institutions
than the study found if the latter are measured in terms of formalization. Consequently, instead
of generating a single prediction for each of the three institutions under consideration, it might
have been advisable to measure norm strength and rule formalization separately. Doing so
would have made it possible to assess the influence of both intersubjective and formal
institutional elements as well as that of organizational culture.
A third potential problem that the definition may help to avoid is the failure to identify
and differentiate among distinct causal pathways, as suggested by Andrew Cortell and James
Davis’s (1996) path-breaking study of the ways in which international norms and rules affect
state behavior through the actions of domestic political actors. A key condition, or intervening
variable, in their model of institutional influence is the domestic “salience” of a rule or norm.
They measure salience in terms of the legitimacy accorded the rule or norm in the domestic
political context as well as level of domestic commitment indicated by declarations of support by
authoritative actors, ratification, concrete alterations in policy choices, and formal incorporation
into domestic processes. They, then, assess the model through an examination of two “heuristic”
case studies of US policymaking: (1) the US semiconductor industry’s efforts to persuade the
Reagan administration to press Japan to comply with the rules of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and (2) Congressional efforts to pressure the Bush administration to
pursue a multilateral strategy following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Because the study explicitly does not differentiate between formal and intersubjective
institutional elements, however, it obscures the possibility that very different causal mechanisms
may be at work in different international institutional contexts, even if the outcomes are similar.
In particular, the case studies suggest that different types of institutions lend themselves to
different forms and degrees of domestic salience. More formal institutions such as the GATT
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rules are more likely to be formally incorporated into domestic laws and procedures, whereas the
impact of primarily intersubjective phenomena such as the norm of collective security depends
largely on the extent to which they acquire legitimacy in the domestic context. Thus, explicit
recognition of the ontological distinction proposed here could help to produce a richer, more
differentiated theory of institutional effects.
A fourth potential problem with which the definition proposed here could help concerns
the failure to select institutional cases that are as comparable as possible, which is suggested by
Liliana Botcheva and Lisa Martin’s (2001) useful effort to explain the effects of international
institutions in terms of whether they promote convergence or divergence in state behavior.
These scholars hypothesize in particular that convergence is more likely to occur when states
recognize that noncompliance will result in substantial externalities and the relevant institutions
possess adequate monitoring mechanisms. To establish the plausibility of this hypothesis, they
explored three cases that exhibit variation in the level of externalities: (1) development aid
cooperation among OECD countries, (2) the establishment of the Single European Market, and
(3) international cooperation to limit stratospheric ozone depletion.
The three cases also, however, exhibit significant differences in the nature of the
regulative rules and norms of state behavior on which the institutions were based. Both the
Single European Market and international cooperation on ozone involved formally agreed upon,
legally binding rules that lent themselves to enforcement. In contrast, the OECD development
aid regime was based on a goal (0.7 percent of GNP annually) that was neither legally binding
nor enforceable. Indeed, this aspirational target did not even command a normative consensus,
as many OECD members expressed reservations and two had not accepted it even with
reservations as late as 1985 (Lumsdaine 1993: 247). Arguably, these fundamental differences in
the nature of the basic rules and norms could by themselves account for much of the variation in
institutional effects that Botcheva and Martin found. Consequently, future research on this
subject might benefit from the careful selection of cases involving institutions based on highly
similar sets of regulative norms and rules.
Generating New Research Questions
A further potential benefit of the definition proposed here is that it can help to generate useful
new research questions that might otherwise be overlooked. The types of questions scholars ask
are constrained by the assumptions that underlie their models. Thus, rationalists and
constructivists by emphasizing the rule- and norm-like characteristics of international
institutions, respectively, may have unnecessarily and inappropriately restricted the ambit of
institutional research. In their otherwise laudable survey of the institutional literature, for
example, Martin and Simmons (1998: 742-757) present a purely rationalist research agenda for
the study of institutional effects, one which must perforce neglect the ways in which a large
number of international institutions matter.
The definition suggests at least two broad sets of questions that seem worth pursuing.
One concerns the differing causal relationships between regulative norms and rules as
independent variables, on the one hand, and international behavior and outcomes as dependent
variables, on the other. The reconsideration of the Legro (1997) data above suggests that, as a
first step, it is important to study the relative impact of regulative norms and rules under different
circumstances. Such work should, in turn, stimulate and inform efforts to develop a better
comparative understanding of the different mechanisms through which formal rules and
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intersubjective norms operate to shape behavior, the value of which is suggested by the Cortell
and Davis (1996) study. And throughout this process, scholars should be attentive to possible
interactions between the intersubjective and formal elements of particular institutions rather than
treat them simply as alternative explanatory variables. What difference does it make, for
example, whether or not a strong norm is formalized or a highly formalized rule is accompanied
by a strong sense of obligation?
A second broad and potentially valuable area of research concerns the basic forms-intersubjective or formal--that international institutions take. For instance, some otherwise
functionally similar institutions, such as the prohibitions on the use of chemical and nuclear
weapons, have assumed very different forms. Why is this the case? A related question is when
and how the basic nature of institutions change. Some primarily formal arrangements may
acquire a strong intersubjective element of obligation over time, while others may not, and yet
others may experience a loss of legitimacy. Conversely, states have formalized some
international norms as treaties but not others. And what roles might formal rules play in the
development of norms, and vice versa? For example, although Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:
900) do not explicitly differentiate between the two, they state that in most cases an emergent
norm must become institutionalized in specific sets of presumably formal rules and organizations
before it is widely adopted. Arguably, their path-breaking analysis of the norm life cycle would
have been richer and more accurate if it had been informed by the definition presented here.
Conclusion
This essay began with the premise that the formulation of adequate definitions of key concepts is
essential to the process of theory development. The scholarly literature on international
institutions has suffered from the lack of a widely accepted definition that includes all the most
important forms. The purpose of this essay was to remedy this deficiency by elaborating a
comprehensive, yet differentiated definition of international institutions that can serve as a solid
foundation for the development of a better understanding of their nature, causes, and
consequences. Integral to the definition are two distinctions--one ontological and one
functional—that, in turn, serve as the basis for a taxonomy within which all types of international
institutions can be located.
This definition promises to advance the study of international institutions in several ways.
At a minimum, it should promote an appreciation of the full range of possible institutional forms
and, simultaneously, help to clarify the extent and limits of existing and future studies of
international institutions. In addition, the definition should help to improve work on the subject
by making scholars more attentive to potential variations in institutional forms. Beyond simply
helping to remedy or prevent the repetition of past mistakes, it should stimulate the development
of both richer and more comprehensive theories of international institutions. And no less
important, the definition should help to open potentially valuable avenues of research by
generating new questions and inspiring fruitful comparisons. Theoretical progress will
inevitably occur as scholars seek increasingly to relate different institutional forms to one
another. At the same time, by facilitating the differentiation of institutions into their constituent
ontological and functional components, the definition may help to deepen our understanding of
specific institutional types.

Duffield - 18

References
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. (2000) Hard and Soft Law in International Governance
International Organization 54:421-456.
Arend, Anthony Clark. (1999) Legal Rules and International Society. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Aust, Anthony. (2000) Modern Treaty Law and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Barnett, Michael. (1996) Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States
System. In State Sovereignty as Social Construct, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and
Cynthia Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Biersteker, Thomas J., and Cynthia Weber, eds. (1996) State Sovereignty as Social Construct.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boekle, Henning, Volker Rittberger, and Wolfgang Wagner. (2001) Constructivist Foreign
Policy Theory. In German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies,
edited by Volker Rittberger. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Botcheva, Liliana, and Lisa L. Martin. (2001) Institutional Effects on State Behavior:
Convergence and Divergence. International Studies Quarterly 45:1-26.
Bull, Hedley. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Buzan, Barry. (2004) From International to World Society? English School Theory and the
Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. (1995) The New Sovereignty: Compliance with
International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Checkel, Jeffrey T., ed. (2005) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.
International Organization 59: Special Issue.
Chinkin, C.M. (1989) The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International
Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38:850-866.
Claude, Inis L., Jr. (1966) Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the UN.
International Organization 20:267-279.
Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis, Jr. (1996) How Do International Institutions Matter?
The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms. International Studies Quarterly
40:451-478.
Denzau, Arthur, and Douglass North. (1994) Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions.
Kyklos 47:3-31.
Dessler, David. (1989) What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate? International
Organization 43:441-473.
Finnemore, Martha. (1996a) National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Finnemore, Martha. (1996b) Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s
Institutionalism. International Organization 50:325-347.
Finnemore, Martha. (2003) The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of
Force. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change. International Organization 52:887-917.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. (2001) Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research

Duffield - 19

Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics. Annual Review of Political
Science 4:391-416
Garrett, Geoffrey, and George Tsebelis. (1996) An Institutional Critique of
Intergovernmentalism. International Organization 50:269-299.
Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. (1992) Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some
Conceptual and Measurement Issues. Journal of Conflict Resolution 36:634-666
Haas, Peter M., Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy. (1993) Institutions for the Earth:
Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Hall, Rodney Bruce. (1999) National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International
Systems. New York: Columbia University Press.
Hechter, Michael, and Karl-Dieter Opp, eds. (2001) Social Norms. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Holsti, K.J. (2004) Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jepperson, Ronald L., Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein. (1996) Norms, Identity, and
Culture in National Security. In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press.
Johnston, Alastair Iain. (2001) Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.
International Studies Quarterly 45:487-515.
Katzenstein, Peter J. (1996) Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security. In The
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J.
Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press.
Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O. (1988) International Institutions: Two Approaches. International Studies
Quarterly 32:379-396.
Keohane, Robert O. (1989) Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics. In
International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory,
edited by Robert O. Keohane. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Keohane, Robert O. (1990) Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research. International Journal
45:731-764.
Keohane, Robert O. (1993) The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a EuropeanAmerican Research Program. In Regime Theory and International Relations, edited by
Volker Rittberger. New York: Oxford University Press
Klotz, Audie. (1995) Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. (2001) The Rational Design of
International Institutions. International Organization 55:761-799.
Krasner, Stephen D. (1988) Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective. Comparative Political
Studies 21:66-94.
Krasner, Stephen D. (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Kratochwil, Friederich V. (1989) Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical
and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Duffield - 20

Kratochwil, Friedrich V., and John Gerard Ruggie. (1986) International Organization: A State of
the Art of the Art of the State. International Organization 40:753-775.
Legro, Jeffrey W. (1997) Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism.
International Organization 51:31-63.
Lipson, Charles. (1991) Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? International
Organization 45:495-538.
Lumsdaine, David Halloran. (1993) Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid
Regime, 1949-1989. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Martin, Lisa L. (1992) Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Martin, Lisa L. (1993) Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions.
World Politics 45:406-432.
Martin, Lisa L., and Beth Simmons. (1998) Theories and Empirical Studies of International
Institutions. International Organization 52:729-757.
Martin, Lisa L., and Beth Simmons, eds. (2001) International Institutions: An International
Organization Reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mearsheimer, John J. (1994-1995) The False Promise of International Institutions. International
Security 19:5-49.
Mitchell, Ronald B. (1998) Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International
Regimes. International Studies Quarterly 42:109-130.
Morris, William, ed., (1975) The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Morrow, James D. (2001) The Institutional Features of Prisoner of War Treaties. International
Organization 55:971-991.
North, Douglass C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. (1989) World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and
International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. (1986) An Agenda for the Study of Institutions. Public Choice 48:3-25.
Ostrom, Elinor. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Philpott, Daniel. (2001) Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International
Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Price, Richard. (1995) A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo. International
Organization 49:73-103.
Raymond, Gregory A. (1997) Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms.
Mershon International Studies Review 41:205-245.
Richards, John E. (1999) Toward a Positive Theory of International Institutions: Regulating
International Aviation Markets. International Organization 53:1-37.
Risse, Thomas. (2002) Constructivism and International Institutions: Toward Conversations
across Paradigms. In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, edited by Ira
Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York: Norton.
Roberts, Adam. (2003) Intervention: One Step Forward in the Search for the Impossible.
International Journal of Human Rights 7:142-153.
Ruggie, John Gerard. (1998) What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the
Social Constructivist Challenge. International Organization 52:855-885.

Duffield - 21

Sandholtz, Wayne. (1993) Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in
Western Europe. World Politics 45:242–270.
Schauer, Frederick. (1991) Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based
Decision Making in Law and in Life. New York: Oxford University Press.
Scott, W. Richard. (1995) Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Searle, John R. (1995) The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press.
Simmons, Beth, and Lisa Martin. (2002) International Organizations and Institutions. In
Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and
Beth Simmons. London: Sage Publications.
Stein, Arthur A. (1990) Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International
Relations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Steinmo, S. (2001) Institutionalism. In International Encyclopedia of the Social and
Behavioral Sciences, vol. 11, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Weber, Steven. (1997) Institutions and Change. In New Thinking in International Relations
Theory, edited by Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Wendt, Alexander. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Wendt, Alexander, and Raymond Duvall. (1989) Institutions and International Order. In Global
Challenges and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s,
edited by Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
Young, Oran R. (1980) International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation. World Politics
32:331-356.
Young, Oran R. (1983) Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes. In
International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Young, Oran R. (1986) International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions. World
Politics 39:104-122.
Young, Oran R. (1989) International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and
the Environment. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Young, Oran R, ed. (1996) The International Political Economy and International Institutions.
Vol. I. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar.
Young, Oran R. (1999) Governance in World Affairs: Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Duffield - 22

Strong

Peaceful dispute
settlement, Racial
equality, Just war theory,
Anticipatory self-defense,
Nuclear taboo, pacta sunt
servanda

U.S.-Soviet measures to
reduce risk of nuclear war,
COCOM, Wassenaar
arrangement, SALT II,
NATO force goals, National
self-determination, UNGA
resolutions

Self-defense, ABM treaty,
Chemical Weapons Ban, Antislavery convention, Partial
test ban

U.S.-Soviet incidents at sea
agreement, Universal
Declaration of Human
Rights, GATT rules, Climate
Change Convention,
Helsinki Final Act, Rio
Declaration, Torture
convention

Non-intervention, Land Mine
Ban, Nuclear nonproliferation regime, Anticorruption conventions, WTO
rules, Comprehensive Test
Ban

U.S.-Soviet “hotline”
agreement, OPEC quotas,
Interwar strategic bombing
agreement

General proscription of the
threat and use of force,
Protection of Wetlands
Convention, Territorial
waters, Navigational rules,
Postal conventions

(Formal rule, strong norm)

(Strong norms, not
formalized)

Norm
(Strength)

Weak or
Nonexistent

Spheres of influence,
Humanitarian
intervention
(Emergent norm, not
yet formalized)

General disarmament,
Preventive war, Balance
of power
(Weak norm, no
formal rule)

(Unratified rule, little
normative content)

(Formal rule, less than
universal norm)

(Formal rule, weak or
nonexistent norm)

Low

Duffield -- 43

Rule
(Degree of
formalization)

High

Figure 1. Locating Institutional Elements

Table 1. Typology of International Institutions
ONTOLOGICAL FORMS
Intersubjective Norms
(includes customary international law,
spontaneous regimes)

Combinations of Norms and Rules
(includes but not limited to codified
customary international law and some
negotiated regimes)

Formal Rules
(includes imposed regimes and some
negotiated regimes)

Sovereignty statehood,
racial equality

Status of diplomats and diplomatic missions
(e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations)

IGO constitutions
(e.g., IMF Articles of Agreement, ICAO
Convention)

Regulative
(includes regime
norms and rules)

Traditional laws of war
(e.g., Just war doctrine)

Codified laws of war
(e.g., Geneva Conventions),
General Assembly declarations

Interstate regulatory agreements
(e.g., 200-mile limit, GATT trade rules,
postal conventions, Open Skies Treaty)

Procedural
(includes regime
procedures)

Norms of consensus, unanimity, and
sovereign equality (one state, one vote)

Procedures for treaty negotiation,
ratification, and interpretation (e.g., Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties)

Formal IGO procedures
(e.g., Security Council voting rules, WTO
dispute resolution procedure)
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